Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
BIJOB BEYTULHIKME INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.16, ss.45-55, 2026 (ESCI, TRDizin)
This article examines David Lewis's gunk ontology as an alternative to ontological approaches such as mereological atomism and mereological nihilism, which are significant in contemporary metaphysics. The concept of gunk, based on the principle of infinite divisibility, rejects the existence of indivisible atoms and presents a vision of a universe where every object is composed of smaller parts. Such ontological model deeply questions the fundamental building blocks assumed by atomism and the concept of mereological sums rejected by nihilism. The article discusses the critical grounds provided by the gunk ontology on key issues such as parthood relations, property-bearers, and metaphysical unity, analyzing how this approach reveals the limitations of classical mereological theories.