Beyond Atomism and Nihilism: The Metaphysical Challenge of Gunk Ontology
BIJOB BEYTULHIKME INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.16, ss.45-55, 2026 (ESCI, TRDizin)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 16
- Basım Tarihi: 2026
- Doi Numarası: 10.29228/beytulhikme.87673
- Dergi Adı: BIJOB BEYTULHIKME INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), Central & Eastern European Academic Source (CEEAS), Index Islamicus, Philosopher's Index, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM)
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.45-55
- Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
- İstanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
This article examines David Lewis's gunk ontology as an alternative to ontological approaches such as mereological atomism and mereological nihilism, which are significant in contemporary metaphysics. The concept of gunk, based on the principle of infinite divisibility, rejects the existence of indivisible atoms and presents a vision of a universe where every object is composed of smaller parts. Such ontological model deeply questions the fundamental building blocks assumed by atomism and the concept of mereological sums rejected by nihilism. The article discusses the critical grounds provided by the gunk ontology on key issues such as parthood relations, property-bearers, and metaphysical unity, analyzing how this approach reveals the limitations of classical mereological theories.