On the Security of an Authentication Scheme for Smart Metering Infrastructure

Yahya K., Chaudhry S. A., Al-Turjman F.

2020 International Conference on Emerging Technology in Computing, Communication and Electronics, ETCCE 2020, Virtual, Dhaka, Bangladeş, 21 - 22 Aralık 2020 identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1109/etcce51779.2020.9350916
  • Basıldığı Şehir: Virtual, Dhaka
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Bangladeş
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Ephemeral Secret Leakage attack, Smart City Security, Smart Grid Authentication, Smart Home
  • İstanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Recently, in 2019, Kumar et al. (IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 10.4 (2018): 4349-4359) proposed an ECC based lightweight authentication and Key agreement scheme (LAKA) to secure the communication among a smart meter (SM) and a neighbourhood area network (NAN) gateway. The LAKA scheme was proved as secure and efficient as per the comparisons performed by Kumar et al. Specifically, it was argued through security analysis that LAKA provides anonymity and resistance to related attacks. However, the specific analysis in this paper contradicts their claim and it is shown here that in addition to ephemeral secret leakage attack and lack of untraceability, the LAKA is also vulnerable to stolen verifier attack.