Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
ASEAD 11. ULUSLARARASI SOSYAL BİLİMLER SEMPOZYUMU, Lausanne, İsviçre, 21 Mayıs 2023, cilt.11, ss.1017-1021
Philosophy of action as a branch of philosophy includes a variety of action theories. The
human or non-human action itself is commonly associated with the concepts of agency and
intention. An action theory thus offers explanations for the causes of the occurrence of events that
are generally considered to be carried out by agents.
Donald Davidson's classical or causalist theory of action is the most frequently used of
these theories. According to this approach, the essential element that makes intentional action
possible is the desire-belief pair. So if the agent intends to do something, it means they desire to
do that and believe the action they intend is doable and satisfies the desire.
From a classical point of view, the meaning implied by the concept of intention points to a
conscious state. The intention that emerges through the desire-belief pair that the agent possesses
is put forward as the cause of the action. Therefore, the intention is inevitably associated with a
conscious agent in such cases.
This article outlines the limits of a philosophy of action that can be developed from a
Freudian perspective that conversely attributes the causes that make conscious action possible to
human states in which we are mostly unconscious. In doing so, we will first sketch the ontological
framework of the philosophy of action. Secondly, we will examine Donald Davidson's DB pair as
the most common example of a classical theory of action. Finally, we will discuss how Sigmund
Freud's widely known view of the unconscious would function in a Davidsonian causalist action
theory.
Keywords: Philosophy of Action, Agency, Donald Davidson, Sigmund Freud, Free Will